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Introduction
Agricultural interventionism is often justified on ideo-
logical grounds, with reference to the objectives of food 
security, food production self-sufficiency, food safety and 
natural resource protection. There is a lack of quantitative 
criteria that might indicate what kind of support should be 
provided, and to whom, in order to produce benefits in terms 
of social well-being.
The concept of political rent is defined based on the 
theory of rent-seeking – but is it conceptually appropriate to 
contemporary agricultural policy in developed countries? By 
definition, political rent is inextricably linked to the wastage of 
resources and to exclusive benefits provided to selected social 
groups at the expense of others. No attempts have yet been 
made in the literature to quantify political rents, even though 
this might lead to an improvement in the effectiveness of pub-
lic expenditure. This, in our view, is a significant gap.
The present work aims, firstly, to review the concepts of 
rents and rent-seeking as used in the literature on political 
economy with regard to their appropriateness to the discus-
sion on European Union (EU) agricultural policy. Secondly, 
we attempt to develop a methodology for quantifying pure 
political rents in agricultural policy, and apply it to a compar-
ative analysis of rents from the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) in the 27 EU Member States in the years 2004-2012. 
In this way they refute certain stereotypes concerning the 
CAP, while seeking an answer to the question of what part 
of the subsidies paid to agriculture in the EU-27 is justified 
by the concept of payment for public goods or compensation 
for imperfections in agricultural markets, and what part has 
no objective justification and represents a pure political rent 
according to the rent-seeking theory.
This reasoning contributes also to the discussion on the 
fair level of the CAP payments in different Member States. 
Per-hectare payments are substantially lower in the countries 
that joined the EU in 2004 and subsequently. This arrange-
ment is usually supported by the argument that those coun-
tries have lower labour costs. However, if policy makers 
care about equal conditions for competition they should also 
consider other market imperfections. Some of them mani-
fest in Cochrane’s treadmill effects (Cochrane, 1958; Levins 
and Cochrane, 1996), as well as in the occurrence of public 
goods. We aim to show how the CAP consensus might be 
changed by including these effects.
Political rents and rent-seeking: a 
literature review
Rent-seeking involves a striving by economic entities to 
obtain benefits (primarily financial or material) by exerting 
influence on relevant institutions, such as through lobbying4. 
More detailed definitions refer to active rent-seeking, which 
denotes the expenditure of resources by private firms and 
interest groups for the purpose of obtaining protective forms 
of regulation from those in authority (Sztaba, 2002). Two 
points may be emphasised: firstly, that active rent-seeking 
includes legal activities and, secondly, that these restrict the 
free management of resources and to some extent distort 
competition.
The political rent market is formed on the one hand by 
those demanding the desired regulations, namely the afore-
mentioned interest groups and manufacturers’ and consum-
ers’ associations, which expend funds for that purpose and to 
which particular regulations will bring measurable benefits 
(such as protection of an internal market, maintenance of 
prices, approval or non-approval of a particular type of con-
sumer good etc.). The response to that demand is a supply, 
4 The term was first defined by Krueger (1974), although the phenomenon had been 
considered previously by Tullock (1967).
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created by politicians and officials, who ‘sell’ the regulations 
over which they have authority, in exchange for political sup-
port. Research shows that, fearing loss of electoral support, 
such persons are willing to intensify their actions relating to 
rent-seeking (Persson et al., 1997; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
What occurs, then, is a kind of political economic trans-
action (Zybertowicz, 2010). More concretely, it can be con-
cluded that political rent most often occurs in the form of a 
transfer of income from certain entities to others, through 
the use of mechanisms of political power, and not – as is nor-
mally the case – through market mechanisms. On a micro-
economic approach, the benefits obtained should be consid-
ered individual benefits, and the expenditure made should 
be treated as ‘investment’. Hence, if in a democratic society 
the interests of narrow social groups are carried over to the 
actions of public authorities, thus providing those groups 
with exclusive benefits (rents), then this constitutes a politi-
cal rent (Wilkin, 2012).
From a social standpoint, one may analyse the losses 
resulting from the unproductive use of resources, and this 
has been the subject of many theoretical works. From this 
perspective, the concept of political rent serves to explain 
why economically-ineffective measures are put into effect 
by politicians, and then maintained in force, even when they 
cause obvious harm to the well-being of society. Policy may 
thus be ineffective in terms of overall well-being (causing 
non-optimal allocation of resources and distortion of market 
stimuli) if it provides preferential treatment and potential 
benefits for specific interest groups that constitute a suffi-
ciently strong electorate (Buchanan et al., 1980; Tollison, 
1982; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Schneider and Wagner, 2001; 
Lee and Tollison, 2011; Aligica and Tarko, 2014).
In this light, it can be claimed that the EU’s intervention-
ist agricultural policy provides an example of the existence 
of political rent. Rent-seeking in EU agriculture, however, 
does not concern only political lobbying. The claim that 
subsidies and other instruments of the CAP produce exclu-
sive benefits for farmers at the cost of consumers is some-
what trivial and not entirely accurate. The question would 
appear to be more complex, as the benefits are not always 
exclusive, in view of the fact that farmers provide certain 
public goods, and moreover agricultural producers need 
to fulfil certain requirements, expending their resources, 
in order to receive those privileges. According to Tullock, 
rent-seeking is profitable only in conditions of perfect 
competition and absence of economies of scale (Tullock, 
1980a; Tullock, 1991). If economies of scale are present, 
the total value of investment required to obtain a political 
rent is greater than the rent itself (Tullock, 1980b; Tullock, 
1991). This would mean that small family farms, which are 
not able to generate economies of scale in production, are 
net beneficiaries of political rents, while large farms, for 
which meeting the CAP’s environmental requirements car-
ries a significant alternative cost, may not receive any net 
rent. In other words, the cost of producing the public goods 
required in exchange for political rent exceeds the value of 
the rent (Aligica and Tarko, 2014). The present study aims 
to establish whether this theory of Tullock is applicable to 
agriculture in the EU.
In the literature, particularly in the field of political econ-
omy, political rents are considered widely, in relation to both 
the mechanisms for seeking (competing for) them, and their 
consequences for market processes and well-being. Below we 
make a review of various theoretical and empirical approaches 
to the concept of political rent, particularly those which pre-
sent in a new light the problem of rent-seeking in relation to 
the EU’s CAP. To these approaches may be ascribed the fol-
lowing hypotheses, put forward by the authors cited below: 
(a) the greater the degree of political competition, the higher 
the political rents (in other words: small interest groups have 
greater political strength); (b) market imperfections determine 
the distribution of political rents; and (c) rent-seeking may 
be complementary to an increase in production (the theory of 
complementarity between rent-seeking and production).
The fourth thesis refers to the phenomenon of political 
competition, in the sense of the intensity of rivalry between 
political parties (Roemer, 2006). The results of a study by 
Fałkowski and Olper (2014) show clearly that when the level 
of political competition is higher, the rents paid to agriculture 
are greater. This positive correlation can be observed in both 
developing and developed countries. The interpretation of this 
phenomenon is based, firstly, on an analogy between economic 
and political competition. Political parties cannot act against 
the will of the majority, just as producers cannot act against 
trends in consumption (Becker, 1958; Stigler, 1972). On the 
other hand, Olson’s theory of interest groups states that it is 
small groups that have greater political power (Olson, 1965), 
because as interest groups expand, the readiness for collec-
tive action declines. This leads to a ‘development paradox’ 
(Swinnen et al., 2000; Olper, 2001; Grzelak, 2011): in highly 
developed countries agriculture makes a relatively small con-
tribution to GDP, but receives relatively large political rents 
– since the agricultural lobby is small, but well-organised and 
politically strong (Poczta-Wajda, 2013). Moreover, economic 
development alters the division of the costs and benefits of 
support for agriculture (Swinnen, 2009). Per capita costs 
are distributed between an increasing number of persons 
employed outside agriculture, entailing a weakening of stimuli 
to protest against protectionist agricultural policy. At the same 
time, processes of urbanisation increase demand for services 
based on the state of the natural environment, which is inevi-
tably connected with rural areas. There is therefore an increase 
in the utility of the public goods supplied by agriculture, and 
in readiness to pay for them. Hence retransfers of income to 
agriculture, even if ineffective from an economic standpoint, 
are rarely challenged by political groupings (Aidt, 2003). As a 
result, the observation that in developed countries agriculture 
is subsidised, while in developing countries it is taxed in net 
terms, comes to be valid globally.
The best-developed line of research is that concerned 
with the effect of imperfections of the market (imperfect 
competition) and of agricultural policy (imperfect imple-
mentation) on the distributional effects (‘incidence’) of 
agricultural policy (Alston and James, 2002; de Gorter and 
Swinnen, 2002). It is found that only 20 per cent of total 
market and price support in agriculture in the OECD coun-
tries creates a net surplus in agriculture, while the remainder 
flows out to related sectors (OECD, 2000), including to land-
owners (except where individual farms are concerned). This 
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phenomenon is referred to by the authors as a ‘surplus drain’ 
from agriculture, and is particularly marked in Central and 
Eastern European countries. Research conducted in Poland 
shows that it occurs regardless of the scale of agricultural 
interventionism, and for example in the period 1990-2003, 
prior to Poland’s accession to the EU, it was equally strong. 
It can be concluded from this that market imperfections in 
sectors related to agriculture affect not only the division 
of political rents to agriculture (if such exist), but also the 
division of the surplus resulting from increasing agricultural 
productivity in general.
In view of the importance of this problem and the lack of 
adequate research in this area, we will devote the remainder 
of this paper to it. In Western Europe and the USA, where 
agricultural interventionism has operated continually since 
the 1950s, studies have confirmed that imperfect competi-
tion in the areas of agricultural food processing and the 
manufacture of means of production and service provision 
to agriculture has a significant effect on the distribution of 
political rents (McCorriston and Sheldon, 1991; Salhofer 
and Schmid, 2004). In turn, it has been shown (Ciaian and 
Swinnen, 2009) that the net effect of area payments on the 
profits of single-product farms is negative. For example, in 
extensive grain production, while farms profit directly from 
subsidies and indirectly from the increased efficiency result-
ing from subsidised investments, they lose significantly due 
to the increase in prices of rent and purchase of land, whose 
marginal productivity increases, stimulating demand. These 
losses are dominant in the balance of costs and benefits of 
decoupled payments. Mixed farms, however, may gain over-
all, as CAP payments make it easier for them to obtain credit.
Diverging from the main line of thought concerning the 
decrease in overall well-being due to the payment of political 
rents is the ‘theory of complementarity of rent-seeking and 
production’ (Teng, 2013). Based on a model formalisation, 
that author challenges the universality of the thesis whereby 
rent-seeking is identified with a fall in productivity, and pro-
poses a theory in which increased production and rent-seek-
ing are not substitutes. These processes become complemen-
tary when the entities seeking rent are also producers, and 
their production output at the same time constitutes inputs to 
the rent-seeking effort. It is not easy to apply this generalisa-
tion to agriculture (it would be as if farmers paid lobbyists 
in agricultural products), but certain analogies may be noted. 
If it is accepted that the ‘products’ of agriculture include 
specific public goods, they may also represent a bargain-
ing counter for the agricultural lobby and politicians. In this 
sense the aforementioned complementarity of production 
and rent-seeking also arises in agriculture. This is an issue 
to which we shall return in a later part of our considerations.
The above review of the literature leads to the important 
conclusion that political rents in agriculture diverge from the 
essence of the concept of rent-seeking, which is inextricably 
linked, firstly, to wastage of resources and loss of overall 
well-being and, secondly, to exclusive benefits obtained by 
selected social groups at the expense of others.
• If the resources devoted to rent-seeking even partly 
serve to produce public goods, then that part cannot 
be regarded as wastage (according to the theory of 
complementarity of rents and production).
• If the payment of political rents to agriculture results 
in the delivery of any public goods, then these ben-
efits are not exclusive.
• If market imperfections in sectors related to agricul-
ture cause rents and economic surplus to be captured 
by other entities, then it is even more the case that 
these benefits are not exclusive.
The above considerations motivated us to attempt to 
give a new definition of political rent in agriculture, and to 
develop a methodology for measuring it. There are no reports 
in the literature concerning attempts to quantify political 
rents, even though this might lead to an improvement in the 
effectiveness of public expenditure. It is generally accepted 
that agricultural incomes are primarily a result of institu-
tional actions rather than the action of the market (subsidies 
account for approximately two-thirds of agricultural income 
in EU Member States on average). For many years, the costs 
of agricultural production have been estimated to exceed 
the revenue generated in more than one half of EU Member 
States, and if it were not for the subsidies paid to farms, agri-
cultural production would become entirely unprofitable (cf. 
relationship of decoupled subsidies to agricultural income: 
according to Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 
data, in most Member States it is above 0.5 but there are also 
instances where it exceeds 1).
We must be aware, however, that the stream of subsi-
dies received by farmers does not in its entirety constitute a 
political rent as hitherto construed. In this study an attempt 
is made to evaluate a new category – the ‘pure political rent’ 
obtained by agriculture in the various countries of the EU-27. 
To enable this category to be considered, it is necessary to 
distinguish within the total pool of subsidies received by a 
farmer the payment made for public goods generated by the 
farm, and the part which serves to compensate for the drain-
age of economic surplus resulting from market imperfec-
tions, which causes the prolonged opening of ‘price scissors’ 
in agriculture. There are also discussions in the literature 
concerning the distribution of political rents in the context of 
market imperfections, for example in relation to land (Ciaian 
and Swinnen, 2006), credit (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009), and 
fishing restrictions (Wilen, 1989, Holzer et al., 2012). The 
residual amount can then be regarded as a surplus benefit 
not having any economic justification, and representing the 
result of rent-seeking.
Methodology for measuring pure 
political rents
We stated above, based on a review of the literature, that 
the distribution of political rents is dependent on market 
imperfections in agriculture and related sectors. Moreover, 
market imperfections decide not only about the distribution 
of political rents, but also about the division of economic 
rents in general. The price flexibility5 is mainly responsible 
for draining economic rents from agriculture. It is particu-
5 Tomek and Robinson (1990) define the price flexibility coefficient as 
(∆P/P):(∆Q/Q), where P denotes prices and Q output.
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larly characteristic of the sector of agricultural raw materi-
als according to the concept of agribusiness of Davis and 
Goldberg (1957). Also, Cochrane (1958) introduced the 
notion that farmers are on a treadmill which, in spite of their 
constant efforts to improve factors productivity (TFP), wears 
away any profits that might result. The point of departure for 
Cochrane was the statement that it is a myth that agriculture 
returns to balance automatically. In the case of increasing 
supply, a disproportionately high decrease in prices can be 
observed and, ultimately, it turns out to be disadvantageous 
for revenue even in the long run.
The EU’s CAP sets itself the goal of ameliorating the 
effects of market imperfections in areas related to agricul-
ture. Reforms of the CAP in recent years have aimed to 
soften the effects of market inefficiencies in such areas as 
absence of remuneration to agriculture for the supply of pub-
lic goods, the lower level of income compared with other 
sectors of the economy, and limitations on access to external 
financial capital (EC, 2010).
In order to model the flow of rents of price flexibil-
ity in agribusiness, it is necessary to separate processes 
of changes in real productivity from changes in prices of 
products and inputs. The change in real productivity in the 
agricultural sector (excluding subsidies) is calculated using 
the I-O (Input-Output) approach. In general, the proposed 
method of computing TFP change is based on indicators 
of total factor productivity of the Hicks–Moorsteen (HM 
TFP index, cf. Coelli et al. 2005), which have been decom-
posed in the input-output matrices for agricultural sec-
tors of different countries. The method was developed by 
Lecomte and Louis (1974) and also adopted by Gburczyk 
(1990) as the global productivity surplus accounts. It is a 
different approach to changes in TFP than that generally 
found in the literature. Changes in TFP are calculated in 
real terms (after elimination of the effects of prices, sub-
sidies and other payments from the CAP), not on the basis 
of the Malmquist Productivity Index but using input-output 
matrices (60 input-output variables). The Malmquist index 
has become extensively used in international comparisons 
of agricultural productivity since it does not require prices 
for its estimation, which are normally not available. In this 
case we had available a complete matrix of price indices for 
60 input-output variables, prepared with the use of Euro-
stat data. The I-O approach to measure TFP changes has a 
substantial advantage: it allows to estimate monetary value 
of the productivity change. Then one can assess the tread-
mill effect and distinguish the part of the economic surplus 
flowing out of farms as the result of flexible prices. The 
change in real productivity on the farm level is expressed 
as follows:
 (1)
where Qi is the quantity of product i in successive years (t–1, 
t); Fj is the quantity of external input j in successive years 
(t–1, t); Pi is the price of product i in year t–1; Rj is the price 
of external input j in successive years (t–1, t); and ΔTFP 
is the change in the real productivity of factors (in money 
units), neglecting the CAP and prices fluctuations.
In equation (1) the variable Qi is determined by price 
expectations. Productivity is understood here as the output 
produced with given inputs. In turn, the flow of rents result-
ing exclusively from the change in prices of sold products 
and purchased means of production is given by the equation:
 
(2)
where HICP is the inflation rate; ΔASt is the change in the 
farm’s economic rents in period t relative to t–1 (the drain-
age or inflow of economic surplus through prices known as 
Cochrane’s treadmill effect); other symbols have the same 
meaning as in equation (1).
For example, a farm has additional surplus (rent) com-
paring to a previous period t–1 when the actual revenues in 
real prices ( ) exceed the revenues in constant prices 
(Qit · Pit–1) deflated with producer price indices for specific 
outputs. Similarly, it has also unexpected surplus if the actual 
outlays in real prices ( ) is lower than the outlays in con-
stant prices (Fjt · Rit–1) deflated with producer price indices for 
specific inputs.
There are some limitations of this approach. A behav-
iour of farmers in our model is quite naïve since they 
consider a change of prices for the same amount of prod-
uct (Qit ) in two consecutive periods. If the stationary 
equilibrium was reached, both the production amount 
and prices would change. However, in this case we 
assume that the equilibrium is not stationary but static. 
We argue that it is an effect of adaptive expectations in 
agriculture. The equations (1) and (2) stay in the relation: 
ΔTFP + ΔAS = actual change in income.
The value of pure political rents PR for a representative 
farm over a long period lasting for n years is computed using 
equation (2) in the following way:
 
(3)
 
(4)
where n is the number of periods; PRt1...tn is the political rent 
in period t
1...tn; Si is the subsidy paid to agriculture under the s 
CAP programmes; VPGi is the payment for the public goods 
supplied by a representative farm according to the g CAP 
programmes (the choice of programmes is discussed below); 
other symbols have the same meanings as in equation (2).
By the above methodology, PRt1...tn was computed for 
an average farm from the FADN representative sample of 
approximately 80,000 farms, according to classes based on 
standard output (SO) in the EU-27 Member States in the 
period 2004-2012. For estimating the value of rents for the 
whole population of representative farms using the FADN 
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sample in a given Member State, the aggregate values 
,  and ΔAStn  for an average farm were mul-
tiplied by the number of representative farms in the class in 
question6.
CAP dilemmas of payments for  
public goods
The dilemmas faced by contemporary European agri-
culture come down to resolving the conflict between the 
pro-environmental and pro-social elements of the CAP, and 
the need to keep EU agriculture as competitive as possible. 
Attempts to solve these problems can be illustrated by sev-
eral example areas involving instruments of the CAP. The 
first is the determination of the relationship between the 
support provided under Pillars 1 and 2. There is a conflict 
of interest here between farmers, who are decidedly more 
interested in the instruments of Pillar 1 (particularly direct, 
income-supporting subsidies), and consumers, who expect 
rural areas to function as a supplier of public goods (Cooper 
et al., 2009; Lyon, 2009), namely the preservation of land-
scape and natural features, biological diversity and high 
quality of food products. It seems that, considering the needs 
of a wide group of citizens, agriculture ought to fulfil the 
function of a quasi-public sector – that is, we can expect to 
observe an increase in the role played by Pillar 2. However, 
in order to receive specified services it is necessary to pay the 
farmers – otherwise they will cease such activity and engage 
in the production of the agricultural raw materials that 
become more profitable according to demand for food and 
prices on the world market (Czyżewski and Stępień, 2009). 
Observation of the evolution of rural areas in EU Member 
States indicates that the centre of gravity of the Polish rural 
economy may soon shift in the direction of increasing impor-
tance for extra-agricultural functions. This is also indicated 
by the CAP reforms since 2014. There is also an awareness 
that it is not possible for the development of rural areas to be 
regulated by a market mechanism. Account must be taken of 
preservation of the state of the natural environment and care 
for the rural landscape, so as to preserve the identity of the 
countryside in spite of the increasingly rapid changes taking 
place (Wilkin, 2011).
Let us return to the previously-discussed thesis that “if 
the resources devoted to rent-seeking even partly serve to 
produce public goods, then that part cannot be regarded as 
wastage (according to the theory of complementarity of rents 
and production)”. It is nonetheless debatable how that part is 
to be defined. According to the assumptions of the concept 
being considered, rent-seeking farmers are also producers, 
and the positive external effects of their actions, having the 
nature of public goods, are in some sense rent-seeking out-
lays, in the sense of a bargaining chip providing legitimacy 
for the seeking of subsidies. Nonetheless, not all types of 
6 The SO classes are defined based on the value of output corresponding to the 
average situation in a given region for various types of agricultural production. In 
the FADN methodology, farms are described according to their SO values as follows: 
EUR 2,000-8,000: ‘very small’; EUR 8,000-25,000: ‘small’; EUR 25,000-50,000: 
‘moderately small’; EUR 50,000-100,000: ‘moderately large’; EUR 100,000-500,000: 
‘large’; above EUR 500,000: ‘very large’.
CAP subsidies carry a tangible effect in the form of public 
goods. The concept of a public good here is something of a 
generalisation. It includes not just utilities with the attributes 
‘non-rivalrous’ and ‘non-excludable’ – namely pure public 
goods (Head, 1962; Buchanan, 1968) – but also common 
goods, in whose case rivalry occurs between consumers. It is 
debatable whether support from Pillar 1 of the CAP leads to 
the creation of public and common goods. A certain step in 
this direction is certainly provided by the cross-compliance 
principle, but this can be said to serve more the maintenance 
of the usefulness of the private resource of land and other 
assets for the production of high-quality food in the long 
term. The receipt of area payments is not subject to strong 
restrictions as regards the chemicalisation of agriculture or 
increased intensity of agricultural production, which can 
have a negative effect on the environment and thus on com-
mon goods. Nonetheless a number of programmes under Pil-
lar 2 of the CAP, directed towards the development of rural 
areas, undoubtedly lead to the direct creation of new com-
mon goods or care for existing ones. In our view, these attrib-
utes pertain in particular to agri-environmental payments, 
support for least favoured areas (LFAs), set-aside payments, 
and to the subsidies to rural area development (RDA).
We tried to find the selection which is the least disput-
able, however we are aware of its limitations. If we assumed 
that instruments used within the CAP are strongly comple-
mentary to each other, it would be impossible to increase 
the provision of public goods without a growth in Pillar 1 
payments. One may argue that delivering public goods is a 
direct by-product of agricultural activities (as in line with the 
multifunctionality of agriculture argument). In that sense, 
for having these public goods we need to have agricultural 
activities. The latter are supported by direct subsidies (Pillar 
1 of the CAP). As a corollary to that: direct subsidies also 
contribute to public good deliveries (in that case our defini-
tion would be too narrow). However, by this reasoning we 
conclude that many more activities produce public goods, 
and the notion of ‘public good’ is too wide to support it by 
public funds.
We should also remember that a large part of the subsidies 
in the EU Member States that joined the EU prior to 2004 is 
of a historical nature. Thus, one can argue that introducing 
so-called ‘payments for public goods’ was used just to pre-
serve the status quo (so that the share is held more or less 
constant). In other words, one may argue that changes are 
only the rhetoric and not the sustainable philosophy. Collat-
ing Sweden, Finland and Austria with other Member States 
should be treated with caution as these countries joined the 
EU (and the CAP) when the movement towards ‘greening’ 
was already in place. In fact, there are arguments that they 
used LFA or agri-environmental payments precisely to max-
imise their share in the budget, as with any other strategy 
they would be worse off. Finally, there are doubts about the 
efficiency of using funds for public goods. It is hard to say 
whether this is the optimal way to achieve the goal.
Seeking a compromise, we follow the rule that any 
attempt to ‘green’ agriculture is better than doing nothing 
and we assumed that the agri-environmental payments, 
LFAs, set-aside payments and RDA subsidies contribute to 
public goods provision. We analysed the contribution of the 
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aforementioned payments (called by way of simplification 
‘payments for public goods’) to the total subsidies paid to 
average farms in the EU-27 Member States in 2004-2012 
(Tables 1 and 2). It was expected that, in accordance with 
current discussions and progressive reforms of the CAP, 
this share of the total subsidy would be found to be increas-
ing. It turns out that this is one of the myths concerning 
the CAP. The reality is quite different, and the postulates 
concerning the pro-environmental and multifunctional 
direction of the CAP prove to a large extent to be mere 
declarations. In most EU Member States the level of these 
payments remains relatively stable, while in the others it 
is usually decreasing. The highest percentage of payments 
for public goods is recorded in Austria and Finland (ca. 
40 per cent of total subsidies), countries where, in view of 
the unfavourable geography and consequent lower profit-
ability of agricultural production, traditional agriculture is 
shrinking markedly in favour of organic production, supply 
of public goods and multifunctional development of rural 
areas. The proportion is also large, although decreasing, 
in Slovakia and Luxembourg (average 34 and 30 per cent 
respectively) and in Slovenia and Sweden (average 29 per 
cent). The lowest proportion accounted for by such pay-
ments is found in Denmark (4 per cent), Spain and Poland 
(6 per cent), and Belgium (7 per cent), where favourable 
conditions for production successfully compete with the 
realisation of extra-agricultural functions in rural areas. 
Also interesting are France and Germany, two of the largest 
agricultural producers in the EU, where in the period under 
analysis there was a marked fall in payments for public 
goods as a percentage of total subsidies – respectively from 
14 to 9 per cent and from 19 to 11 per cent.
It can be assumed that the stream of subsidies theoreti-
cally linked to the supply of public goods is insufficient for 
them to be substituted for other payments and related pro-
ductive activity. The data in Tables 1 and 2 show that pay-
ments for public goods are not more widely used in the ‘old’ 
EU-15 Member States than in the EU-12, although it appears 
that Romania, Bulgaria and Poland are not making full use 
of their possibilities in this area. In those countries the envi-
ronmental potential is large, but in our view the structure of 
Pillars 1 and 2 of the CAP is determined by political reasons, 
since easily-available area payments represent the most per-
suasive offer to rural electorates.
Table 1: Payments for public goods as a proportion of total subsidies to an average farm in the EU-15 Member States in the period 2004-
2012.
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 mean
Denmark 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04
Spain 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Belgium 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07
Italy 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09
France 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10
Germany 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
Netherlands 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.13
Portugal 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.14
Greece 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.16
United Kingdom 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18
Ireland 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.22
Sweden 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.29
Luxembourg 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.24 0.30
Austria 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.40
Finland 0.40 0.45 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.40
Source: own calculations based on FADN data
Table 2: Payments for public goods as a proportion of total subsidies to an average farm in the EU-12 Member States in the period 2004-
2012*.
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 mean
Romania - - - 0.00 0.001 0.01 0.006 0.18 0.07 0.02
Bulgaria - - - 0.00  0.02 0.06  0.11 0.06 0.06 0.06
Poland 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.09  0.10 0.08  0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06
Lithuania 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.11  0.13 0.10  0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10
Cyprus 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.11  0.04 0.09  0.16 0.11 0.26 0.11
Hungary 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.14  0.17 0.14  0.20 0.24 0.22 0.11
Latvia 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.19  0.14 0.15  0.16 0.10 0.16 0.14
Malta 0.30 0.06 0.18 0.28  0.23 0.14  0.12 0.11 0.14 0.16
Czech Republic 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.21  0.25 0.22  0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21
Estonia 0.27 0.34 0.29 0.29  0.22 0.24  0.30 0.25 0.25 0.27
Slovenia 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.32  0.26 0.33  0.27 0.25 0.32 0.29
Slovakia 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.40  0.38 0.36  0.31 0.25 0.27 0.34
* 2007-2012 for Romania and Bulgaria 
Source: own calculations based on FADN data
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Pure political rents in EU-15 and 
EU-12 Member States
In accordance with the methodology adopted, political 
rents were computed for farms belonging to various standard 
output classes over a period of eight years, in the ‘old’ (Table 
3) and ‘new’ EU Member States (Table 4). We recall that the 
values given represent that part of EU agricultural subsidies 
which has no objective justification either as payment for 
public goods or as compensation for market imperfections 
affecting agriculture (leading to high flexibility of agricul-
tural prices). They therefore have the features of political 
rents. Our analysis is a pioneering attempt to quantify the 
phenomenon of pure political rent.
There are usually two arguments raised in a discussion 
on the differences in the per-hectare CAP payments across 
Member States and the total amount of subsidies resulting 
from these differences: (a) they exist due to the differences in 
historical yields, production areas, production volumes and 
livestock numbers; and (b) the per-hectare direct payments 
of the individual Member States have been converging, 
and this process of external convergence is to be continued. 
Although both arguments are reasonable, does it change 
anything in the interpretation of ‘pure rents’ distribution? As 
aforementioned, the pure rents in our approach has no objec-
Table 3: Political rents realised by farms by standard output (SO) class in the EU-15 Member States in the period 2004-2012.
Country
Political rents from farms by SO class  
(% total political rents in the country) CAP  
subsidies  
(EUR bn)
Pure  
political rent 
(EUR bn)
Political rent 
(% agricul-
tural added 
value)
Political rent of 
country  
(% total rents 
in EU-27)
I II III IV V VI
France - - 10.3 24.6 61.2   4.0 74.72 67.26 30.6 19.3
Germany - -   6.4 12.4 49.5 31.7 55.95 49.29 41.6 14.1
Italy   8.7 18.9 13.2 15.6 31.5 12.1 42.18 38.39 18.2 11.0
Spain   7.0 26.1 18.2 21.0 26.2   1.5 41.99 36.12 20.1 10.3
United Kingdom -   1.7 11.1 24.8 55.4   7.0 34.08 25.77 38.8   7.4
Greece 23.4 45.5 21.2   8.2 1.7 - 20.05 16.75 35.5   4.8
Ireland   5.5 28.6 24.6 19.5 21.8 - 15.37 11.74 95.1   3.4
Austria - 25.3 24.7 25.9 24.0 - 15.65   9.45 45.1   2.7
Denmark -   4.6   8.9 10.6 39.9 36.0   8.39   7.80 39.0   2.2
Finland - 13.0 14.4 28.1 44.5 - 13.05   7.69 69.4   2.2
Netherlands - -   2.1   8.8 68.9 20.2   9.42   6.42   9.3   1.8
Sweden -   8.1 13.8 16.8 48.6 12.7   7.71   5.51 46.2   1.6
Portugal   5.1 36.6 16.5 15.1 26.7 -   4.94   3.55 17.3   1.0
Belgium - -   5.8 45.2 49.0   0.0 10.64   2.52 13.5   0.7
Luxembourg - -   6.1 14.1 79.7 -   0.76   0.54 63.9   0.2
EU-15 total   9.9 20.8 13.2 19.4 41.9 13.9 354.92 288.80 38.9 82.7
EU-27 total 13.4 20.7 12.1 17.3 33.2 22.4 425.95 349.42 41.4 100.0
Source: own calculations based on FADN data
Table 4: Political rents realised by farms by standard output (SO) class in the EU-12 Member States in the period 2004-2012*.
Country
Political rents from farms by SO class
(% total political rents in the country) CAP  
subsidies
(EUR bn)
Pure  
political rent 
(EUR bn)
Political rent
(% agricul-
tural added 
value)
Political rent of 
country  
(% total rents 
in EU-27)
I II III IV V VI
Poland 15.2 31.7 19.4 12.1 12.3   9.3 24.53 22.36 36.6   6.4
Hungary   5.4 15.7   7.4 14.0 19.0 38.4 11.69   9.62 52.0   2.7
Romania 34.5 12.1   2.8 14.2 20.2 16.2   9.05   8.85 16.1   2.5
Czech Republic -   5.5   4.1   7.7 20.7 62.0   7.85   5.79 64.8   1.7
Lithuania 24.0 29.1 14.6 11.3 13.8   7.2   3.94   3.51 58.7   1.0
Slovakia - -   2.4   6.4 24.4 66.8   4.59   3.05 78.3   0.9
Bulgaria   7.7   8.2   4.4 12.5 38.9 28.4   3.34   2.91 24.1   0.8
Latvia   5.4 28.8 12.0 11.6 25.8 16.4   2.19   1.80 79.1   0.5
Slovenia 13.8 31.0 17.7 25.0 12.5 -   1.99   1.38 40.1   0.4
Estonia - 13.7   9.6 16.3 27.4 33.0   1.29   0.91 44.2   0.3
Cyprus 18.1 24.9 18.6 29.2   9.1 -   0.48   0.34 13.6   0.1
Malta - 25.5 16.4 15.5 42.6 -   0.11   0.09 19.5   0.0
EU-12 total 15.5 20.6 10.8 14.7 22.2 30.9 71.03 60.61 43.9 17.40
EU-27 total 13.4 20.7 12.1 17.3 33.2 22.4 425.95 349.42 41.4 100.0
* 2008-2012 for Bulgaria and Romania 
Source: own calculations based on FADN data
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tive justification (neither as compensation for public goods, 
nor for the market imperfections), and thus they are simply 
‘a waste of resources’ and ‘a loss of overall well-being’, no 
matter how relatively big they are. So, do the arguments 
mentioned above legitimise ‘old’ Member States to acquire 
a bigger share of pure political rents? In this sense as we 
propose, the pure rent has nothing to do with the yields, pro-
duction, livestock number, labour efficiency etc. It has also 
nothing to do with the size of a country: why might larger 
countries have the right to waste more public funds and to 
reduce the social welfare of the European Community more? 
So, we argue that the pure rents should constitute compara-
ble shares of CAP subsidies in each Member State since the 
subsidy envelopes agreed for a given programming period 
are a kind of political consensus. The rent-seeking level in 
each Member State shall be proportional to this consensus, 
because it would be naïve to assume that rent-seeking may 
disappear at all.
The pure political rents accounted for 77 per cent of the 
CAP subsidies on average (Figure 1). Assuming that actual 
CAP subsidies are a ‘fair political consensus’ for each coun-
try, there are Member States which profit from bigger shares 
of pure rents than others. More rents go to the two groups of 
countries:
• the biggest agricultural producers (such as France, 
Germany, Italy and Denmark);
• ‘new’ Member States with relatively big shares of 
agriculture in their national economies (Poland, 
Romania, Lithuania and Bulgaria). Considering the 
environmental potential of these countries, is not this 
a kind of free-riding?
It occurs at the expense of the countries with intensive 
and productive farming such as Belgium and Netherlands, 
as well as those with substantial environmental resources 
(Austria, Finland, Belgium and Slovakia). Intensive farming 
is likely to be more affected with market treadmill. For this 
reason, should some countries receive more compensation 
from the agricultural policy for market imperfection? Can 
we also reconsider if the present rent distribution is fair 
with regard to the countries with valuable environmental 
resources?
The sum of political rents in the EU in the period under 
analysis was estimated at close to EUR 350 billion, which 
is a substantial share of the EU’s entire budget of EUR 860 
billion for the years 2004-2013. Analysis of the rent realised 
per country over the analysed period as a proportion of total 
political rent in the EU shows that the greatest beneficiaries 
of rent-seeking are the Member States where agriculture is 
the strongest, including France (which receives almost one-
fifth of the total rent), followed by Germany, Italy and Spain 
(with 14.1, 11.0 and 10.3 per cent respectively). Hence, 
farmers in just four countries capture more than one half of 
the political rents from the CAP. It may be thought that this is 
linked to the lobbying strength of agricultural organisations 
from those countries and their engagement in the creation of 
agricultural policy. Confirmation of this comes from the fact 
that the EU-15 Member States account for 83 per cent of the 
total political rents in the EU-27.
Analysis at individual Member State level indicates that 
it is possible to distinguish those where the value of total 
realised rent is:
• relatively equal among farms in different standard 
output classes (e.g. Austria);
• highest among large and very large farms (e.g. the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Germany, Den-
mark, Finland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg);
• highest among small and very small farms (e.g. 
Greece, Lithuania and Romania).
Such a distribution may be a result of the differentiated 
structures of farms in different Member States, and con-
sequent differences in the political importance of the rural 
electorate associated with particular SO classes. For exam-
ple, in Poland approximately one third of political rents are 
received by SO class II (small farms), and these together 
with class I (very small farms) account for almost one half 
of total rents. These classes represent more than 90 per cent 
of the rural electorate, and as can be seen, Olson’s theory 
of interest groups, according to which a stronger political 
influence is exerted by small but well-organised groups, 
does not apply here. Similar situations exist in Romania, 
Lithuania and Latvia, where the agrarian structure is again 
very fragmented, but also in Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and 
Slovenia. A cautious conclusion can therefore be drawn, that 
the distribution of political rents corresponds to the structure 
of farms in a given country, such that the most numerous 
groups receive the largest pool of political rents. Hence no 
confirmation is found for the popular opinion that the largest 
political rents are obtained by sector of the strongest farms. 
On the other hand, economic size categories based on SO 
should be used with caution in this type of analysis because 
the physical size of farms corresponding to a certain SO 
class varies widely between Member States due to the differ-
ences in market prices, yields and produce quality. Bearing 
in mind the heterogeneity of farms within each SO class, we 
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Figure 1: Pure political rents vs. consensus of the CAP EU-27 
in 2004-2012.
Source: own estimation using EU FADN and Eurostat data
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however believe that the comparison of the relatively small-
est farms (I SO in ‘new’ Member States or III SO in ‘old’ 
Member States) with the highest SO class in the respective 
country is quite reasonable and gives a general overview for 
the rent-seeking problem.
A category of note is that of very large farms (SO class 
VI) in Belgium, where there was no political rent at all in the 
analysed period, which means that the sum of the subsidies 
received by a farm, adjusted by payments for the supply of 
public goods, is not able to compensate for the surplus drain-
age caused by price flexibility.
Another issue is the contribution of political rents to the 
added value from agriculture in a given country, shown in 
the penultimate column of Tables 3 and 4. On average, in 
the EU-27 this contribution is 41.4 per cent, and although in 
the EU-12 it is slightly higher, and in the EU-15 somewhat 
lower than average, there are Member States in which that 
value is exceeded almost twofold. We analysed the reason 
why political rents account for more than 95 per cent of 
the added value of agriculture in Ireland, and 78 per cent 
in Slovakia. In all of the extreme cases the problem lies in 
the low real productivity of agriculture, and not in market 
imperfections, which affect agriculture in all Member States 
to a similar degree apart from those with the most intensive 
farming. Irish agriculture uses a very large quantity of mate-
rials – the ratio of indirect consumption to production aver-
ages approximately 1 over the year, compared with an EU 
average of 0.66. A similar conclusion applies to agriculture 
in Slovakia and Latvia. In the Czech Republic, the cause is 
rather the relatively high cost of labour.
It can be asked whether such extreme differences in the 
level of subsidisation of low productivity from the CAP budget 
is socially just, in terms of the balance of costs and benefits for 
the community as a whole. What benefits do the EU taxpayer 
obtain by subsidising highly inefficient agriculture in certain 
Member States? Naturally, indirect benefits can be found, such 
as the maintenance of agricultural incomes and thereby the 
livelihood of rural areas, prevention of depopulation of those 
areas, and assurance of internal demand for food. This may be 
an indication of how the CAP could be more effectively modi-
fied so as to achieve the desired effects, at least those relating 
to the supply of public goods. Perhaps countries with structur-
ally inefficient agriculture ought to supply more public goods 
than they do at present, or else subsidise their agriculture to a 
greater degree from national funds.
Conclusions
The analysis carried out here leads us to conclude that 
agricultural interventionism in the EU requires a special 
conceptual approach, since it is not sufficient simply to 
treat all subsidies as political rents. The new approach we 
propose provides an indication of how to improve the effec-
tiveness of allocation of support for agriculture in individual 
EU Member States. A principal finding of this study is that, 
when using the concept of pure political rent, the EU CAP 
consensus (Figure 1) seems to be much more debatable than 
is usually believed since some Member States gain unex-
pected and unjustified advantages. Moreover, we pointed 
out that it is confusing to call all CAP subsides ‘the politi-
cal rents’ in terms of the rent-seeking theory. Quantification 
of the political rent in agriculture enables a more rational 
and socially-appropriate distribution of support from the 
CAP in accordance with the agricultural policy goals in 
the financial framework after 2014. Measuring pure politi-
cal rents has revealed a new dimension of inequalities in 
the distribution of CAP subsidies which particularly badly 
affect the most productive and the most eco-efficient Mem-
ber States. Although the division of payment envelopes 
between Member States has been decided, since 2014 the 
CAP has gained flexibility in terms of the structure of both 
Pillars and transfers between them. These matters remain 
in the hands of the Member State governments. The prob-
lem may be that in many countries the breaking of the link 
between subsidies and output was reflected more in decla-
rations than in facts, and ways are constantly being sought 
to ‘get round’ that requirement. Such attempts exacerbate 
King’s effect, and mean that a large share of the subsidies is 
not capitalised within agriculture, but are captured by sur-
rounding sectors. Economic surplus flowed out of farms in 
the period 2004-2012 through the unfavourable changes of 
prices, particularly of fertilisers, energy and feedstuffs, but 
also milk and poultry livestock (Czyżewski and Matuszc-
zak, 2017; Czyżewski, 2017) We have in mind here the fact 
that, for example, investment support goes mainly to the 
largest farms, where it is subject to the strongest drainage 
through price flexibility.
Redefinition is also required about the issue of social 
fairness in the determination of the sizes of national CAP 
envelopes. The calculations of political rents show that his-
torical payments are neither a rational nor a just solution, 
because the structurally low profitability of agriculture in 
certain Member States ought to be compensated for by a 
higher supply of public goods, and this is not happening. On 
the other hand, the most productive food suppliers and pub-
lic goods providers are not proportionally ‘rewarded’ with 
political rents. Of course, we are being somewhat facetious 
and we do not claim that the pure political rent is a reward for 
a productivity or eco-efficiency. But in fact, the present CAP 
consensus seems to be the least favourable for the Member 
States that are leaders in productivity and eco-efficiency.
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